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i. not fittingness, not reasons, and not value: against the ‘first’ views
[This is a dra! chapter, chapter IV in the current plan, for my book project The Pragmatic
Foundations of Theoretical Reason. It is still very much in progress. Comments are welcome. If you
would like to cite the chapter in a general way, it is far enough along for that. If you want to cite
some specific argument or clam, it would be best to check with me first in case I’ve made
changes.]
0. Introduction
Future historians of philosophy looking at the current times may wonder about the causes of
the current obsession with finding what normative or evaluative concept or property is first, and
what the temptation was to pursue these projects with at least partially reductive ambitions within
the normative or evaluative domain.¹ Individual positions such as reasons first, fi!ingness first, and
value first² have all individually been criticised, o!en by proponents of one of the other -first views.
This chapter has a broader aim and develops an argument aimed at showing that at least
straightforward versions of each of these views are false.³
¹ Perhaps a partial answer is the present state of the philosophy profession in which younger philosophers and
emerging mid-career scholars feel pressured to be associated with clear views expressed with great confidence,
irrespective of whether the degree of confidence is matched by the degree of support for the view. 
² Several authors defend the fi.ingness-first approach. Some important examples include: Chappell (2012), McHugh &
Way (2016), and Howard (2018). Reasons first perhaps the most prominent treatment in the literature. For book-length
treatments of different versions of the view, see Lord (2018) and Skorupski (2010). For further discussion of the
motivations behind reasons-first views, see Schroeder (forthcoming). Value-first is defended in Maguire (2106) and
perhaps has antecedents in the work defending scalar utilitarianism, for example Norcross (2006). 
³ ‘All’ is strictly an exaggeration. The arguments here do not directly touch on debates about ought + analyses of reasons,
such as the view that reasons are explanations of oughts or that reasons are evidence of oughts. Although I believe
these views to be false as well, the master argument in this chapter provides no support my belief. 
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More specifically, the central aim of this chapter is to establish the claim that at least two of the
three non-descriptive notions used in various -first views – reasons, fi.ingness, and value – have
have unalike variance conditions, and that value in particular has unalike variance conditions with
both fi.ingness and reasons. What I mean by ‘unalike variance conditions’ is that sometimes one
category of non-descriptive properties will change valence (from good to bad, or fi.ing to unfi.ing,
for example) in circumstances in which another does not. 
Showing that different non-descriptive concepts or properties have unalike variance conditions
is one way to show that those concepts or properties are not identical, or that one is not analysable
in terms of the other, due to their not being necessarily co-extensional, which is the minimum
condition for an analysis, reduction, or an identity claim.⁴
I have argued elsewhere⁵ that fi.ingness and value vary in unalike ways under various pairs of
circumstances. I concluded from that argument that the standard version of the fi.ing-a.itude
analysis of value was false. However, the original argument cannot easily be separated from more
complicated questions about the nature of modality. Here I develop what I hope is a more
straightforward argument that reasons and value have unalike variance conditions. A!er giving
that argument, I offer a new, simpler argument that fi.ingness and value have unalike variance
conditions. If these arguments are right, then value is one of at least two normative primitives.⁶
This much view leaves open the possibility that at least one of the non-descriptive properties
may be reducible to one or a combination of the other two. I shall suggest that fi.ingness is the
⁴ See Block & Stalnaker (1999) for an influential defence of the view that necessary co-extension is sufficient for identity
and Chalmers and Jackson (2001) for a defence of the view that it is not. There are other ways to argue against there
being any correct -first view. Daniel Wodak (forthcoming) argues from broader metaphysical consideration against the
general -first project in the non-descriptive domain.
⁵ See Reisner (2015).
⁶ It is important to distinguish this project from the work of authors like Maguire (2016) and his value-first programme,
which I take to be a non-starter. It is a consequence of the arguments here that value first is false, because there will be
at least one other ‘equal’ normative primitive. 
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most likely candidate for reduction or elimination.
1. An overview
Moral philosophers are accustomed to working with two at least apparently distinct families of
broadly non-descriptive concepts and, mutatis mutandis, properties: evaluative concepts and
deontic concepts. Evaluative moral concepts may be thin, such as good or bad. Alternatively they
may be thick, such as admirable or cruel. The deontic moral concepts, including right, wrong, and
morally permi!ed are o!en understood as being special cases of non-moral deontic concepts, namely
ought, forbidden, and permi!ed simpliciter.⁷ We may for convenience group the deontic concepts
under the wider umbrella of normative⁸ concepts, which also includes normative reasons, but which
does not include either evaluative concepts or correctness concepts such as fi!ingness.⁹
Some substantive moral theories are expressed in terms of relations between evaluative
concepts or properties and normative concepts or properties. A simple form of utilitarianism may
be formulated thusly: It is wrong to φ when there is at least one other available action, the
consequences of which are be.er than those of φ-ing. Se.ing aside projects that have treated
utilitarianism as giving a real definition of ought,¹⁰ in general work on consequentialism makes no
special claim at all about whether normative concepts can be analysed in terms of evaluative ones
or vice-versa. And likewise with respect to normative and evaluative properties. Nonetheless, ethics
scholars of many different stripes are disquieted by the lingering possibility that at bo.om there
are unanalysable basic non-descriptive concepts or properties. While they may have to accept at
⁷ See Zimmerman (2015) for more discussion.
⁸ Note that here, as is the practice throughout this book, I am using ‘normative’ in a special sense and not as a blanket
term for a broad class of non-descriptive discourse. 
⁹ ‘Normative’ is o!en used to pick out the family of concepts and properties which I am calling ‘non-descriptive’. At
times, ‘evaluative’ is used that way, too. But I mean to use the names for the concepts and properties in the ma.er I
stipulate.
¹⁰ E.g. Moore (1903)
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least one type of non-descriptive concept or property, they maintain a the-fewer-the-be.er
approach.¹¹ For reasons that are not well-explained by the authors themselves, it seems that
evaluative concepts and properties have been a particular source of anxiety.¹²
1.1 The fi!ing-a!itude analysis of value
One strategy that has its contemporary roots in the work of Franz Brentano is to employ some
version of the fi!ing-a!itude analysis to give a conceptual and/or metaphysical analysis of good and
other value notions in terms of fi!ing pro-a!itudes.¹³ For the moment, let us focus on the
metaphysics. The property of being fi.ing is sometimes understood as its own basic type of
property and sometimes understood as being identical to the property there’s being a normative
reason, or at least a certain type of normative reason. The so-called fi!ing.a!itude analysis of value
(FA) can be stated thus:
1. x is valuable if and only if x is the fi.ing object of a pro-a.itude.
Or perhaps more popularly:
1a. x is valuable if and only if it is fi.ing to favour x.
In 1a) ‘favour’ is a generic pro-a.itude verb. In this instance, the formulations should be read
neutrally insofar as ‘fi.ing’ may be understood either as a distinct concept or property from that of
there’s being a (certain type of) reason or as being identical to there’s being a (certain type of)
¹¹ Wlodek Rabinowicz calls this ‘conceptual gain’, see Rabinowicz (2008 & 2012).
¹² This point emerges clearly in Lang (2008).
¹³ See Danielsson & Olson (2007) for a more detailed discussion of the history of the fi.ing a.itude analysis of value.
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reason.
1.2 From the fi!ing-a!itude analysis to first-ism more generally
A!er having largely faded from philosophical discussions following the 1960s, the fi.ing-
a.itude analysis was brought back into vogue due to the work of T.M. Scanlon, who proposed a
closely related view in the form of the buck-passing account of good.¹⁴ The details of the buck-passing
account need not detail us here. More importantly for present purposes, with the subsequent
publication in 2004 of Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen’s paper, ‘The Strike of
the Demon: On Fi.ing pro-A.itudes and Value’, it became common to accept a formulation like
those in 1) and 1a) as opposed to the buck-passing formulation favoured by Scanlon.
Authors, including Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, saw significant potential in the
fi.ing-a.itude analysis to ease worries about explanatory and both metaphysical and conceptual
complexity by giving a (presumably reductive) analysis of value concepts and/or properties in
terms of fi.ingness (understood as reasons in Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen’s work and
later as a sui generis property by other authors).
It is important to highlight two of the purported advantages of the account. The first is what
Wlodek Rabinowicz calls ‘conceptual gain’.¹⁵ By reductively analysing one non-descriptive concept
(or property) in terms of another, one decreases the number of basic non-descriptive concepts or
properties. Rabinowicz’s interest in conceptual gain presaged the more comprehensive -first
projects.
The second purported advantage is that relations amongst reasons or fi.ingness (according to
the interpretation of ‘fi.ing’ in use) and value are, if not explained, at least accounted for.¹⁶ Value
¹⁴ Scanlon 1998. For a helpful discussion of what buck-passing really amounts to, see Olson (2009)
¹⁵ See fn. 12.
¹⁶ I discuss difficulties with this kind of explanation in Reisner (2009a).
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and reasons, or fi.ingness, co-vary because value reduces to reasons or fi.ingness. 
It suffices to note that authors who endorse the fi.ing-a.itude analysis see the above as
advantages of the view.¹⁷ It suffices, because it helps to explain how the -first views arise. These
desiderata may in principle be used to motivate other -first projects, including those that seek to
reduce fi.ingness to value or reasons. To the extent that one sees this pair of desiderata as
motivating the fi.ing-a.itude analysis, it is wholly natural to pursue an even more complete
reductive project taking any one of the non-descriptive concepts or properties and reducing the
other two to it.
And this is the essence of the -first projects. By picking a single non-descriptive notion to treat
as fundamental, or first, one increases the conceptual or metaphysical gain and also extends the
explanatory(-ish) project. And indeed, each of value, fi.ingness, and reasons have been proposed
as the relevant first notion.¹⁸
The -first projects may have further ambitions. For example, they may seek to provide analyses
of other apparently non-descriptive concepts or properties, such as rationality,¹⁹ or of apparently
descriptive ones such as modality and probability.²⁰ The strategy of finding unalike variance
conditions is fully generic, and perhaps it may be fruitfully applied to these and other further
ambitions. I shall not investigate the ma.er further in this chapter. 
2. Lessons from the fitting-attitude analysis
The central argument in this chapter is that variance conditions are the same for at most two of
the three non-descriptive notions.²¹ The two notions with conditions that are most clearly unalike
¹⁷Ibid. One may indeed wonder, as I do, whether they really are advantages.
¹⁸Citations
¹⁹ Lord (2020)
²⁰ Skorupski (2010).
²¹ I use ‘notions’ here when what the discussion applies to both concepts and their corresponding properties. 
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are value and reasons, or so I shall argue. If they can be shown to be unalike, then all three of the -
first programmes are unsuccessful, at least in their simple forms. I shall take up the task of arguing
that value and reasons have unalike variance conditions in §3. In this section, however, I would like
to revisit the longstanding debate about the fi.ing-a.itude analysis of value, focusing primarily on
the current debate about FA in which fi!ingness is understood as an unanalysable concept or
property. I shall argue that FA fails in §4, but for the moment rest content to make some salient
methodological observations that will provide context for the rest of the chapter. The discussion
here only concerns properties, but both the discussion and the arguments it contains may for the
most part be freely adapted to apply to concepts.
2.1 The abandonment of the wrong kind of reason problem
Before turning to fi.ingness as a sui generis property, I shall begin by recalling why fi.igness
came to be seen that way, as opposed to being another way to express the claim that there is a
normative reason for something. Philosophers working on topics in normativity and value theory
are by now familiar with discussions about the wrong kind of reason (WKR). Lost to some extent
today is the original usage of this term, deriving from Rabinowicz and Rasumussen’s 2004
discussion²² of WKR.²³ For WKR, the meaning of ‘wrong kind of reasons’ is ‘wrong kind of reason
for use in the fi.ing-a.itude analysis’, i.e. they are kinds of reasons that lead to over-generation of
value when they appear in the analysans. I confess to not understanding how the concept of a
reason’s being of the wrong kind applies in the other contexts in which it is now used,²⁴ but the
defects of the post ‘Strike’ literature need not detain us. The original invocation of the wrong kind
²²Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004)
²³ This regre.able loss is likely due to Pamela Hieronymi’s (2005) confusing use of the term. 
²⁴ For examples of the current usage, see Gertken& Kiesewe.er (2017) and Sylvan & Lord (2019). In some of these
papers, it is clear which reasons are reasons of the wrong kind, but it is unclear what the upshot is to being a reason of
the wrong, or right, kind. I thank Daniel Star for pressing me to include this clarification.
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of reason arises for an understanding of ‘fi.ing to favour’ as ‘there being a reason to favour’. On
this interpretation, we can set out the reasons version of the fi!ing-a!itude analysis of value:
2. The reasons version of the fi!ing-a!itude analysis of value (RFAV): x is valuable if and 
only if there is a reason to favour x.²⁵
Drawing on an example of Roger Crisp’s in which an evil demon pressures us to desire a bowl of
mud despite the undesirability of the bowl of mud itself,²⁶ Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen
note that the analysis, at least at first blush, appears to over-generate. Crisp’s bowl of mud example
is intended to show that there is a reason to favour something that is not itself good or otherwise
valuable. The easiest way to construct these examples is by using state-given reasons, i.e. reasons for
holding propositional a.itudes due to certain consequences of holding the a.itude rather than due
to the a.itude’s relation to its contents.²⁷ For example, intuitively there is no reason to desire to eat
a bowl of mud simply for the sake of eating a bowl of mud. However, there is a reason to desire to
eat a bowl of mud, if one would be severely punished for not desiring to do so.
As Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen and Christian Pillar²⁸ respectively observed, cases like
Crisp’s bowl of mud example could be handled by RFAV, if one distinguished between the right
and wrong kind of reasons for the fi.ing-a.itude analysis. And designating state-given reasons as
the wrong kind and object-given reasons (those that obtain in virtue of some relation between an
²⁵ In order to achieve conceptual gain, RFAV must be read as an analysis, and thus ‘with determination going from
right to le!’ should be added. For present purposes it is enough to work with the simple bi-conditional.
²⁶ Crisp (2000).
²⁷ Although I and many other authors associate state-given reasons mainly with consequentialist considerations,
D’Arms & Jacobson (2000) provide an early and influential example of a non-consequentialist state-given reason. 
²⁸ Pillar (2006) uses a different nomenclature, distinguishing instead between ‘content-given reasons’ and ‘a.itude-
given reasons’. The standard nomenclature of ‘object-given’ and ‘state-given’ originates in Parfit (2001).
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a.itude and its contents)²⁹ as the right kind provides a neat solution to the simplest form of WKR.
However, what Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen gave with one hand, they took away with
another, developing the now well-known pairing problem,³⁰ which appears to resist the state-given
reasons as wrong reasons and object-given reasons as right reasons solution to WKR.³¹ There has
been much subsequent literature on WKR and possible solutions³² with inconclusive results.
Nonetheless, an important turning point came in 2007 with the publication of a paper by Sven
Danielsson and Jonas Olson, ‘Brentano and the Buck-Passers’,³³ in which they propose to identify
the right kind of reasons with what they call ‘correctness reasons’. A correctness reason is not itself
a normative reason. Those are called ‘holding reasons’ by Danielsson & Olson, but correctness
reasons, according to Danielsson & Olson, always give rise to holding reasons, although not all
holding reasons have corresponding correctness reasons. Correctness reasons are facts that make
the relation between an a.itude and its content correct. For example, that x has certain
properties – that that make it desirable – is a correctness reason to desire x. That I would get a
prize for desiring x is a holding reason for desiring x, but not a correctness reason, as that does not
make x itself desirable.
In this picture, holding reasons that lack corresponding correctness reasons are reasons of the
wrong kind, whilst those that have corresponding correctness reasons are reasons of the right kind
for RFAV. The important innovation in Danielsson & Olson’s work is the use of the notion of
correctness to solve WKR. And correctness is fi.ingness. Because its being correct (having a
correctness reason) to favour x is on Danielsson & Olson’s view not the same thing as there’s being
²⁹ See Danielsson & Olson (2007) and Reisner (2009a, 2014 & 2018) for more discussion.
³⁰ Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen develop a generic schema to convert state-given reasons into object-given
reasons, thus rendering the distinction unhelpful for solving WKR.
³¹ The pairing problem is the result of an argument demonstrating that there is a procedure generating an object-given
reason out of each state-given reason. The new object-given reasons are not suitable for use in FA.
³² See Lang (2008), Olson (2009), and Samuelsson (2013) for further discussion.
³³ Danielsson & Olson (2007).
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a reason (in the standard sense of the term) to favour x, although the former entails the la.er, they
achieved only partial conceptual gain. If we take them for the sake of argument to have solved
WKR, then we still have a basic non-descriptive ontology with both fi.ingness and normative
reasons as essential parts. 
Despite the richer ontology, we now have a picture in which one no longer needs per se to
discuss normative reasons directly and their relationship to value. Rather, it is enough that we can
(let us suppose) create an extensionally adequate bi-conditional linking fi.ingness (now replacing
‘correctness reasons’) and value without reference to normative reasons. And thus we have the
essential idea behind fi.ingness first account of FA without room for WKR.
2.2 A clue from the wrong kind of value problem
Assuming for the sake of argument that moving from normative reasons to fi.ingness suffices
to resolve, or render obsolete, WKR, then there are two remaining ways to try to argue that FA is
false. The first is to argue that it is a bad analysis for other reasons. This is an approach that Roger
Crisp and I have each addressed in earlier work.³⁴ Although I remain convinced that FA is a bad
analysis for reasons independent of concerns about extensional adequacy, demonstrating that FA
is extensionally inadequate remains the most definitive and secure method to show that it is false.
Thus we may turn to the second alternative, which is to demonstrate that FA under-generates, i.e.
that there are cases in which x is good but it is not fi.ing to favour x.
Two arguments have been developed that a.empt to create what one might dub the ‘wrong
kind of value problem’ (WKV). The first and most influential is due to Krister Byvkvist³⁵ and his
solitary goods objection. Bykvist’s objection invites us to consider a possible world which contains a
single all-things-considered pleasure-experiencing egret and no other individuals past, present, or
³⁴ Crisp (2005) and Reisner (2009a)
³⁵ See Bykvist (2009). Thoughtful criticisms of Bykvist’s view may be found in Orsi (2013).
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future possessed of a mental life. According to hedonism, we should say that that world is a good
(value) containing world, as it has an individual experiencing net pleasure and no individuals
experiencing net pain. 
By stipulation, there are no individuals in the egret’s own world for whom it is fi.ing to favour
the egret’s being happy, or their world’s being such that the egret is happy. If we assume that there
must be at least one historical individual for whom it is fi.ing to favour x in order for it to in fact
be fi!ing to favour x, then it is not fi!ing in the egret’s own world to favour the egret’s being
happy. 
And according to Bykvist, it would not be fi.ing for us, or any creatures, to favour the egret’s
being happy. This is, very roughly, because Bykvist takes the important (for the fi.ing-a.itude
analysis of good) favouring a.itude to be desire. Accordingly, it cannot be fi.ing for us to desire
states-of-affairs in worlds that are causally and metaphysically inaccessible to us, as it is only fi.ing
to desire those things that are possible ways our world could be. Bykvist argues on this basis that if
FA is true, then the solitary egret world is not a good world. But hedonism entails that it is a good
world, and thus FA is inconsistent with hedonism. According to Bykvist, a correct analysis of value
or goodness must not rule out hedonism as a possible axiology. Therefore, FA is false.
Bykvist’s innovative arguments may well be correct. It is difficult to evaluate them succinctly,
because they rely on at least three controversial claims. One is that an analysis of good or value
must be sufficiently neutral so as to admit all intuitively plausible axiologies; the failure of FA is
the failure to accommodate one such axiology, hedonism. A second is that desire is the central, and
perhaps only, relevant a.itude for FA. And finally Bykvist assumes a dispositional account of
desire with demanding fi.ingness conditions.³⁶ 
An additional challenge to evaluating Bykvist’s view, and this is no criticism but rather just an
³⁶ For an in-depth discussion of possible problems with Bykvist’s argument, see Orsi (2013) and Bykvist’s reply (2015)
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observation, is that his view is not in a strict sense an argument that relies on FA under-generating
for value. A!er all, it may be that some other axiology apart from hedonism is true and that that
axiology does not entail that a solitary goods world is a good or valuable world. It is, however, the
first argument of which I am aware that suggests that FA could under-generate for even a single
plausible axiology and is a substantial innovation in the literature.
It is possible to (try to) produce an under-generation argument against FA that is more neutral
in the sense that it does not depend in any interesting way on claims about the ambitions of the
value of analysis, but rather shows that on any reasonable axiology, FA under-generates. This is the
strategy I pursued in ‘Fi.ingness, value and trans-world a.itudes’.³⁷ This argument also requires
various other controversial assumptions, yet it contains the seed of a less controversial strategy for
arguing not only against FA, but against at least some other bi-conditional relations between
different non-descriptive properties. It is from these seeds that the perhaps the less controversial
arguments of this chapter are grown.
3. Unalike variance conditions for reasons and value
Reasons and value have unalike variance conditions, or so I shall argue. And if they have
unalike variance conditions, then that is enough to show that no straightforward x-first theory will
be correct. 
All -first views, or at least any -first view with the ambition of analysis or reduction must be
built on a core bi-conditional that contains one of the non-descriptive properties on the le!hand
side and another on the righthand side. These bi-conditionals may be stronger than simple
material bi-conditionals, for example they may include determination. But since the present
concern is with extensional inadequacy (from under-generation), it will suffice to work with simple
³⁷ Reisner (2015a)
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material bi-conditionals; if the relevant material bi-conditional is false, then a fortiori so is a
strengthened bi-conditional. Let us begin by focusing on the reasons version of the fi.ing-a.itude
analysis:
2. The reasons version of the fi!ing-a!itude analysis of value (RFAV): x is valuable if and 
only if there is a reason to favour x.
F2. RFAV: x is valuable ⟷ there is a reason to favour x
Our target is to develop a schema for creating examples in which x is valuable, but there is no
reason to favour x. We may start by considering the structure of reason relations:
3. The simple reason relation: Fact f is a reason for agent A to ψ to degree d³⁸
In the simple reasons relation, ‘[f]act f’ should be interpreted liberally as including conjunctions of
facts or sets of facts.³⁹ The schematic variable ψ simply stands for anything for which there can be
a reason (i.e. an action, belief, emotion, pro-a.itude, etc). Crucially, reasons are indexed to agents. 
3.1 The under-generation argument for reasons and value
With the basic of the reason relation and RFAV having been set out, it is now possible to
develop a schema for creating cases in which the le!hand side of the bi-conditional is true but the
righthand side is false, thus showing that an analysis of value in terms of reasons to favour under-
³⁸ Many contemporary writers omit the final place in this relation; as Fogal & Risberg (MS) note, this is a mistake. John
Skorupski (2002, 2010) was careful to avoid this mistake in his pioneering work on the metaphysics of reasons. Errol
Lord (2018) and other contemporary reasons-first advocates make this mistake.
³⁹ In Skorupski’s (2002) explication of the reason relation, f stands for a set of facts.
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generates.
The simplest structure for such examples relies on descriptive, or if one prefers, non-normative
entanglement.⁴⁰ One needs to generate examples in which favouring x causes x not to be valuable.⁴¹ I
shall focus on good as a paradigm type of value. Here is a generic counter-example:
4. The generic counterexample: x is good at t1 if and only if  nobody ever has, does, or will 
favour x. 
It is not difficult to fill out the details of this schema by making an appeal to sufficiently
knowledgeable and powerful agents. Imagine that the demiurge has created a powerful entity
whose nature is such that she relieves pain and suffering around the world anytime she waves her
le! arm, so long as nobody ever has, does, or will favour her waving her le! arm. Her nature is also
such that if anyone ever has, does, or will favour her waving her le! arm, however, instead the
effect of her doing so will be that she causes pain and suffering around the world. We may treat the
effect of her waving her arm in both circumstances as necessary due to her nature. 
An example of this form entangles favouring x (descriptive) with x’s goodness (non-
descriptive), or lack thereof. One can construct other such examples, of course, based on the same
schema. Implicit in using an example of this form is the assumption that there is no reason to
favour x if x will be bad, should one favour it. This underlying assumption seems highly plausible
to me on its face. Favouring x effaces the reasons for favouring x and thus defeats even the weakest
guidingness constraints on reasons.⁴²
⁴⁰ See Reisner (2015) and Risberg (2018) for detailed discussions of entanglement. The ‘descriptive’ qualifier is
important; as Haim Gaifman argued as far back as the 1983, normative entanglement is highly problematic. I take this
observation from Wlodek Rabinowicz. 
⁴¹ Strict covariance is also sufficient.
⁴² See Risberg (2020) and Rosenqvist (2020) for further discussion on guidingness.
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Now we are in a position to see why value and reasons have unalike variance conditions in the
arm-waving example. So long as nobody favours the powerful entity’s waving her le! arm, it is
good that she waves her le! arm. If somebody favours her waving her le! arm, then it is bad that
she waves her le! arm. Thus whether or not somebody favours her waving her le! arm changes the
value valance of her waving her le! arm.
If we accept the argument about self-effacing reasons not being reasons at all, then there is
never a reason to favour her waving her le! arm. While the value valence of her waving her arm
changes depending on whether or not anyone favours it, the valence of the reason to favour (i.e. a
reason not to favour) never changes. And thus we have under-generation. 
It is important to note that this example can be given without the modally significant claim
that it is metaphysically necessary that the entity’s powers work in the way that they do. However,
as I shall discuss in §3.2, this additional condition renders one possible objection to the counter-
example impotent.
One may find parallel cases when it comes to reasons for action and value. Suppose that one
offers the following bi-conditional claim about beauty:
5. The beauty bi-conditional: x is beautiful if and only if there is a reason to experience x.
We should understand ‘experience x’ as encompassing actions such as viewing paintings, listening
a.entively to symphonies, watching films, etc. Now consider a delicate sandstone rock formation
whose unique beauty can only be experienced from the changing perspectives given by climbing its
face. Regre.ably the rock is delicate enough that climbing its face destroys those natural features
that make it beautiful, rendering its beauty impossible to experience.
In this case, presumably the features that make the rock formation beautiful do so whether or
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not they can be observed.⁴³ Thus so long as one does not climb the formation, it remains beautiful.
But if one is climbing or has climbed the formation, then the formation is not beautiful, due to the
destructive effects of climbing it. One has no reason to experience the formation, because doing so
effaces the physical features of the formation that provide reasons to experience it; one has no
reason (aesthetic) reason to climb the formation once one is climbing it. Here again, we see that
one has no reason to climb the formation, irrespective of whether one climbs it or not. But the
formation is beautiful if one does not climb it and is not beautiful if one does.
It bears noting at this point that although RFAV is formulated as a material bi-conditional, the
counter-examples would also hold for a counterfactual version of the principle. In all relevantly
similar worlds, the same entanglements would exist.
3.2 Objections to the counter-example schema
It is of course fair to ask whether the assumption about self-effacing putative reasons to favour
not being actual reasons to favour is correct. I believe it is, but I would like to look at three possible
objections against the force of cases built on the entanglement schema.
The first objection is an anti-actualist objection. Consider a well known class of counter-
examples to deontic detachment. Deontic detachment is an inference rule that says if you ought to x
and you ought (if you x then y), then you ought to y. The counter-example is this. You ought to
change lanes and pass the driver in front of you, because the driver in front of you is driving slowly
and unsafely. And you ought (if you change lanes and pass the driver in front of you, then you
accelerate), because the only safe way to change lanes and pass requires you to accelerate. However,
you in fact will not change lanes and pass the driver in front of you. According to deontic
detachment, you nonetheless ought to accelerate, but of course doing so will cause you to crash
⁴³ Objectivism of this sort about beauty is controversial. Nonetheless, I follow Elisabeth Schellekens (2006) in accepting
an adequate degree of objectivity for the purposes of this example. 
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into the car in front of you, since you will not change lanes. Deontic detachment thus entails that
one is doing something that one ought to do by accelerating into the car in front of one’s own.
There are sceptics of this sort of argument.⁴⁴ They defend for various reasons possibilism about
deontic inferences. Because it is possible for you to change lanes and pass the car, it remains true,
according to them, that you ought to accelerate. You cannot cancel your obligations simply by
making choosing to behave in ways that would make filling the obligation counterproductive. 
While the debate between actualists and possibilists is interesting, the arm-waving example
resists the possibilist strategy. In the example, it is part of the arm-waving entity’s nature – it is
metaphysically necessary that – her waving her le! arm relieves pain and suffering when (eternally)
nobody favours it and causes pain and suffering if anyone at any time favours it. Possibilism is
plainly not an available response to that sort of entanglement case.⁴⁵ It may be a good response to
cases where the entanglement is contingent rather than necessary, although I remain sceptical
about possibilism more generally. Of course, one could a.empt to reinsert necessity in less
metaphysically exotic ways by generating examples in which the entanglement is causally
necessary. 
A second objection is that there is a reason for someone in another possible world to favour the
entity’s waving her le! arm, since that person would sit outside the actual world’s past, present,
and future. I find this proposal very odd, but a parallel proposal has been been suggested to me
with respect to fi.ingness. There are a number of technical issues that arise in with respect to this
proposal, many of which I have discussed in depth in an earlier paper.⁴⁶ However, I am now
convinced that there is a (somewhat) more straightforward way to reply to this objection, at least
with respect to reasons.
⁴⁴ Most importantly Benjamin Kiesewe.er (2018).
⁴⁵ The inspiration for this example comes from a conversation with Ralf Bader about potential problems with the
principle of necessary detachment. 
⁴⁶ Reisner (2015).
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Note that this objection is describing a possible reason to favour the entity’s waving her le!
arm, not an actual (in the modal sense) reason to favour it. This would mean that RFAV would
have to be modified:
2a. Possible reasons fi!ing-a!itude analysis of value (PRFAV): x is good in the actual world 
if and only if there is a possible reason to favour x’s occurrence in the actual world. 
Although the arm-waving case is stated in general terms, if has specific implications. If it is
generally good for the entity to wave her le! arm, so long as it is never favoured, then each specific
existentially quantifiable occurrence of her waving her le! arm (when nobody favours her doing so
generally) is also good. A successful of analysis of good, and the bi-conditional on which it is built,
will entail that each specific instance of the entity’s waving her le! arm is good under the condition
that nobody (eternally) favours it. 
PRFAV implies that there is someone in another possible world who has a reason to favour one
or more specific occurrences in the actual world of the entity’s waving her le! arm. This is because
reasons are indexed to individuals. It is doubtful that individuals in other possible worlds can
favour an entity in the actual world’s doing so, because favouring that occurrence would require
having that occurrence in mind. And it is itself doubtful that we can have singular thoughts about
individuals or specific events in other possible worlds; or at least there are good arguments to
suggest that it is metaphysically impossible to have singular thoughts about individuals or
occurrences in other worlds.⁴⁷ While it is an open question as to whether reason implies can for
some senses of can, one seems to have lost all grip on the notion of a normative reason if reason
does not at least imply can metaphysically.
⁴⁷ Ibid. and see Soames (2002).
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But suppose that it is possible to have singular thoughts about individuals or events in other
possible worlds. In that case, PRFAV itself seems like a bad principle, in part because it would over-
generate in a peculiar way. 
Suppose that a powerful being will improve life in another possible world (which is not the
actual world) each time someone in the actual world⁴⁸ performs a cruel act that causes only pain.
Someone in that other world has a reason to favour the performance of those cruel acts in the
actual world, namely that they reduce suffering in her world. According to PRFAV, the fact that she
has a reason to favour their occurrence in the actual (from our perspective) world also makes them
good in the actual world, when it instead is right to say that they are bad in the actual world,
although their occurrence in the actual world is good in her world.
Of course talk about what possible rather than actual individuals have reason to favour in the
actual world is strange in numerous ways, not least of which because it is barely intelligible without
accepting modal realism. The very claim that x is good if a possible person favours it sounds false;
it is difficult to know how to make sense of possible people in a way that would lend even some
plausibility to the proposal without accepting modal realism. Strangeness aside, PRFAV is
extensionally inadequate, which is enough to reject it without complaining about the metaphysics.
The final objection concerns the ‘eternity’ condition in the counter-example to RFAV, namely
that it is implausible to say that the entity in the example’s actions could be affected by what occurs
in future, perhaps because of the assumption that the future is open and thus not knowable. I do
not have very much to say about this objection, because it clearly hinges on the difficult question of
whether the future is knowable and whether perhaps on whether time-travel is at least
metaphysically possible. I am content to let this counter-example be held hostage to such concerns
⁴⁸ The actual operator indexes to this world, where as ‘another possible world’ should be taken to contain a different
indexical operator W, that functions like the actual operator but localises to the world in which it is being used. I
discuss how this operator works in Reisner (2015).
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for the time being. But I would like to stress that I take it seriously.
4. The argument generalised to fittingness
If the argument in §3 is correct, then the remainder of the argument against at least simple
versions of all three -first views is straightforward: 
1) Value and reasons have unalike variance conditions
2) If two categories of properties have unalike variance conditions, then neither can be analysed
in terms of the other.
3) Sub-conclusion: neither reasons nor value can be analysed in terms of the other.
4) Fi.ingness either shares variance conditions with one, but not both, of reasons or value, or 
it shares variance conditions with neither.
5) Sub-conclusion: fi.ingness cannot be used to analyse both value and reasons.
6) Conclusion: None of fi.inginess, reasons, or value may be used to analyse the other two 
non-descriptive properties.
This argument is valid, and it applies even to more sophisticated -first accounts, like Christopher
Howard’s,⁴⁹ which is cleverly constructed so as to avoid cases where fi.ingness under-generates for
reasons. 
Howard’s concern is that if we accept that there are state-given reasons for propositional
a.itudes, standard fi.ingness first theories under-generate. My presentation of Howard’s view is
not entirely faithful to the original, but the changes affect small details in the presentation and not
the central extensional adequacy concerns. His account is built on two main claims:
⁴⁹ Howard (2019)
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6. Value as fi!ingness (VAF): x is non-instrumentally good if and only if it is fi.ing to 
favour x.
And
7. Reasons as fi!ingness (RAF): There is a reason to desire x if and only if: 1) it is fi.ing to 
desire x, or 2) it is fi.ing to desire that one desire x.
VAF is just FA. RAF, read with the first conjunct alone, says that there is a reason to desire x if and
only if it is fi.ing to desire something. That would appear to rule out state-given reasons to desire,
like those given in Crisp’s bowl-of-mud example. Intuitively, it is good in that example that you
desire the bowl of bud. That entails, according to VAF, that it is fi.ing to desire that you desire the
bowl of mud. Howard stipulates that when a second order desire it fi.ing, then there is a reason to
have the first order desire. This resolves the under-generation problem for state-given reasons.
However, notice that Howard’s view still entails that x is good if and only if one has a reason to
desire or favour it. That is because because the righthand side of VAF and the first disjunct on the
righthand side of RAF specify the same condition, namely that it is fi.ing to favour x. Thus when
it is fi.ing to favour x, x is good and there is a reason to favour x.
The arguments in §3 show that reasons have unalike variance conditions from value. This
raises a new question. Which non-descriptive property has unalike variance conditions from those
of fi.ingness? The answer, I shall argue, is at least value. To do so, I shall introduce a new version of
of WKV for fi.ingness. I shall take up the question of whether reasons and fi.ingness ever have
unalike variance conditions in §5.
 
4.1 The over-generation argument against the fi!ing-a!itude analysis of value
There are, as far as I can see, two strategies for showing that fi.ingness and value have unalike
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variance conditions. One strategy is the strict argumentative analogue of the arm-raising argument
presented in §3 against RFAV. One need only swap in ‘fi.igness’ for reasons and fix the grammar
accordingly to see how such an argument would look. 
However, there is a complication. The argument in §3 relied on adopting what I shall call the
‘realisability condition for reasons’ (RCR):
8. Realisability condition for reasons (RCR): Fact f is a reason for agent A to ψ to degree d 
only if A can (metaphysically) φ whilst there is (still) a reason for A to ψ.
As I noted in §3, it is difficult to doubt this condition. A parallel condition would be required to
transfer the same argumentative structure to fi.ingness. That would give us a realisability condition
for fi!ingness (RCF):
9. Realisability condition for fi!ingness (RCF): It is fi.ing to favour A’s ψ-ing only if A can
(metaphysically) ψ whilst it is (still) fi.ing for A to ψ.
Intuitions about this principle may be less clear than they are for RCR. However, I do not think
that RCF is really doubtable. Consider the following value claim and its fi.ing a.itude
counterpart: 
C1V. It is good that A ψs only if A does not ψ.
C1F. It is fi.ing to desire that A ψs only if A does not ψ.
C1f follows from C1v, since the conditions on fi.ingness must be the same as the conditions on
value. C1v is surely false on at least one reading. It is an instance of an analytically false general
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schema:
C1G: There is some instance of A’s ψ-ing such that there is no instance of A’s ψ-ing
and A’s ψ-ing is F
This reading concerns the properties of a particular event, rather than an event type. Particular
events have properties. In order to have those properties, they must exist. C1V and C1F are
therefore false when read as being about particular events.
Of course, that is not the only reading. However, the reading does not improve if we treat A ψs
as a comparison class. It still follows that A’s ψ-ing is never good, and thus the unconditional
claim, that A ψs is good, is always false.
We can leverage this insight into a defence of RCF:
C2F. It is fi!ing that S favour A’s ψ-ing only if S does not favour A’s ψ-ing.
There is no instance of S’s favouring A’s ψ-ing that has the property of being fi!ing, if this
conditional is true. We can strengthen C2F to share the same modal robustness as we see in the
arm-raising example:
C2F*. It is, or would be, fi!ing that S favour A’s ψ-ing only if S does not, or would
 not, favour A’s ψ-ing.
According to C2F*, not only are there no actual instances of S’s fi!ingly favouring that A ψs, but
there are also no possible instances of it either. There are no actual or counterfactual instances of
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S’s fi!ingly favouring that A ψs.⁵⁰ 
Someone who wishes to deny RCF must offer an interpretation of ‘fi.ing to favour’ that is
consistent with there’s being no possible instances of favouring, actually or counterfactually, that
have the property of being fi.ing.
Insofar as I can see, the remaining option is to allow that S and A exist in different worlds. I
have already mentioned some difficulties with doing this,⁵¹ but I shall set those aside. The arm-
raising example poses no problem for FA if we allow trans-world fi.ingness, its being fi.ing for an
individual in one world to favour events or states-of-affairs in another, into the analysis. 
However, trans-world fi.ingness has its own difficulties. In particular, it over-generates for
value. I can offer two kinds of example. The first is the example of a.itudes that are fi.ing on
comparative grounds:
10. Comparative admiration: It is fi.ing to admire individuals, the moral character of 
whom is substantially higher than our own and than that of those around us.
In the actual world, this is at least a plausible fi.ingness principle. In Rocky, Rocky Balboa watches
a fight on t.v. from a local bar. Apollo Creed wins, but the bartender dismisses Creed as a chump.
Rocky is appalled, and criticises the bartender, saying that at least Creed took his best shot,
noting that the bartender has not done anything remotely so worthy with his life. Rocky is of
course impressed that Creed won, but he also admires his dedication to developing his talents.
The retort and the admiration would be out of place if Creed’s efforts were merely typical for
⁵⁰ Note that a similar situation arises in Bykvist’s solitary goods world; there are no individuals who can favour the
egret’s being happy, nor could there be, assuming that the world’s being populated by a single egret is essential to its
being the world that it is.
⁵¹ See §3 and Reisner (2015).
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Rocky, the bartender, and the other ‘schlubs⁵² from the neighbourhood’.
If we accept comparative admiration, or any other fi!ingness claim with a similar structure,
we end up with the following problem. Suppose that S lives in a possible world occupied only by
people of low moral character. S comes to learn about A, who exists in a different possible world.
Although A is in fact a pre!y awful person by the standard’s of A’s world, he is a paragon of virtue
compared to those who inhabit S’s world. It is fi!ing for S to favour A, but it is clearly not the
case that A has the property of being admirable in A’s own world. That is the first example of
over-generation. 
Here is a second. If we accept the strange picture on which people in one world can get those
in other worlds in mind, the following is a possible case. Individuals in S’s world take the greatest
pleasure from feats of daring-do in other worlds. In her own world, A sets out to climb its tallest
mountain. It is fi!ing for S to favour that A climb the mountain, because A’s doing so is good in
S’s world, due to the pleasure her doing so would cause. But let us suppose that A’s climbing the
mountain in her own world will allow her to install the relay that will bring Skynet online. Thus
her climbing in the mountain is bad in her own world. It is fi!ing for S to favour that A climb the
mountain, but it not good in A’s world that she do so, violating the central bi-conditional of FA.
I therefore conclude that value cannot be reduced to fi!ingness, and I have argued that value
cannot be reduced to reasons. This entails that value is not subject to analysis or bi-conditional
equivalence in the manner required for fi!ingness-first and reasons-first theories.
5. Reasons and fittingness
We are now le! with a final question. Is one of reasons or fi.ingness first relative to the other? I
believe the answer to this question is ‘no’, but I have no conclusive argument to offer to that effect.
Instead of offering a conclusive argument, I wish to return to Danielsson & Olson’s 2007 paper.
⁵² Henry Hill expresses a similar sentiment, although in his case about being a schnook, in Goodfellas. 
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When Danielsson & Olson set out to solve the wrong kind of reason problem, they did so by
importing an additional non-descriptive notion, correctness. Correctness is fi!ingness. Recall that
their strategy was to divide normative (holding) reasons into two kinds: those that arise from
correctness and those that do not. The former are suitable for FA, and the la!er are not. The
reasons that are not suitable for use in FA cannot, according to Danielsson & Olson, be
accounted for by correctness. Or to be more precise, they do not claim that those reasons are
accounted by correctness. 
If we look back to Howard’s reasons as fi!ingness condition, he offers a way of accounting for
the non-correctnress reasons in terms of fi!ingness. According to Howard, there is a reason to
have a pro-a!itude with contents c if it is fi!ing to favour c or if it is fi!ing to favour favouring c.
This second condition is perhaps necessarily co-extensional with Danielsson & Olson’s holding-
but-not-correctness reasons. Let us suppose that it is.
A proposed advantage of Howard’s view is that it offers conceptual gain. But conceptual gain
comes at the cost of theoretical unity. The relationship between fi!ingness and reasons looks ad
hoc, with the second disjunct of the bi-conditional introduced only to ensure extensional
adequacy.
Perhaps one might want to defend the introduction of the second disjunct by pointing out
that on Howard’s view, this makes sense of reasons’ being sensitive to value. Reasons’ sensitivity
to value is explained by the underlying fi!ingness relation between fi!ingness and value on the
one hand and fi!ingness and reasons on the other. If it is fi!ing to favour x, then x is good,
according to Howard. And if it is fi!ing to favour favouring x, then favouring x is good.
Correspondingly, there is a reason to favour x, namely that x is good. And favouring x itself turns
out to be good when there is a reason to favour favouring x.
However, if, as I have argued, there is no bi-conditional equivalence between its being fi!ing
to favour x and x’s being good, then the relation between reasons and fi!ingness, if there is one,
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does nothing to explain whatever relation there is between reasons and value. The loss of
theoretical unity and explanatory gain seems to sap the independent motivation for accepting
reasons as fi!ingness, making it look like it is an ad hoc principle designed to ensure extensional
adequacy.
To this end, I am much more strongly inclined to think that a view like that offered by Conor
McHugh and Jonathan Way⁵³ is well motivated, albeit still false. On their view, one has a reason to
desire x only if it is fi!ing to desire x, excluding Howard’s additional disjunct that there is a
reason to desire x if there is a reason to desire to desire x. They stand with philosophers such as
Derek Parfit and John Skorupski in suggesting that all reasons are correctness reasons. And this
fact is meant to be explained by the primacy of fi!ingness. 
If one assumes, as I do, that there are non-correctness reasons for pro-a!itudes, McHugh &
Way’s account is not extensionally adequate. Howard’s account provides an extensionally
adequate bi-conditional linking fi!ingness and reasons. But there are two grounds for doubting
that this suggests that fi!ingness is prior to reasons. 
The first of these grounds is that fi!ingness does not do the work of reasons. The idea that
underlies reasons, oughts, and other normative – in the narrow sense used in this chapter –
properties is that they are guiding in some loose sense. This seems to put a fi!ingness-before-
reasons view onto the horns of a dilemma. It fi!ingness is not a normative property, then there is
more to something’s being a reason than its being fi!ing; a new feature, guidingness, is added.
On the hand, if fi!ingness is guiding, fi!ingness then looks rather like a normative property,
perhaps so much so that one doubts that there is anything more to being fi!ing than being a
reason that obtains in virtue of certain kinds of relations between an a!itude and its contents.
If the arguments in the rest of this chapter are correct, and fi!ingness is not prior to value,
⁵³ McHugh & Way (2016)
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then there seems to be no special reason to believe that fi!ingness is in general more basic in the
relevant sense than other non-descriptive properties. 
This is clearly not a conclusive argument against the claim that fi!ingness is prior to reasons.
However, normative notions are central to much of our ethical and even epistemological
theorising, and if we are not willing to lose the guidingness that characteristic of the normative,
then it is difficult to see how fi!ingness will in any interesting sense be prior to reasons. Perhaps
the reverse is true as well, but I shall let the ma!er rest here.
6. Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that value is not analysable in terms of reasons or fi.ingness, due
to the extensional inadequacy of such analyses. This also shows that -first views that have the
ambition to reduce two of fi.ingness, reasons, and value to the remaining third property or
concept are false. I have not taken up the interesting question of the aims or ambitions of -first
projects. If the argument here are correct, that is unnecessary. The least ambitious version of the -
first projects is to provide adequacy conditions for all non-descriptive properties in terms of just
one non-descriptive property. Even this least ambitious project cannot survive the falsification of
the relevant bi-conditional claims. More ambitious projects will necessarily imply more, and are a
fortiori also false.
The arguments in §5 are incomplete, but perhaps suggestive of the claim that reasons cannot
be analysed in terms of fi!ingness. Whether the reverse is true is uncertain, but I see no special
grounds for optimism. 
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